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Abstract
While Artificial Intelligence has successfully outperformed humans in complex combinatorial games (such as chess and checkers), humans
have retained their supremacy in social interactions that require intuition and adaptation, such as cooperation and coordination games.
Despite significant advances in learning algorithms, most algorithms adapt at times scales which are not relevant for interactions with
humans, and therefore the advances in AI on this front have remained of a more theoretical nature. This has also hindered the experimental
evaluation of how these algorithms perform against humans, as the length of experiments needed to evaluate them is beyond what humans
are reasonably expected to endure (max 100 repetitions). This scenario is rapidly changing, as recent algorithms are able to converge
to their functional regimes in shorter time-scales. Additionally, this shift opens up possibilities for experimental investigation: where do
humans stand compared with these new algorithms? We evaluate humans experimentally against a representative element of these
fast-converging algorithms. Our results indicate that the performance of at least one of these algorithms is comparable to, and even
exceeds, the performance of people.
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1. Introduction
Since its inception, the field of Artificial Intelligence (AI) has
both fascinated and frightened human society. After Turing
argued that machines can demonstrate intelligence [1], both
the scientific literature and popular culture explored the many
possible future ramifications of this phenomenon, some of
which are not so favorable to humanity. Indeed, AI technolo-
gies have been developing at a staggering speed, building
largely on the exponential growth in computer processing
power [2] and increased algorithmic sophistication. Moreover,
AI technologies are becoming pervasive in our everyday lives,
with applications ranging from internet search and medical
diagnosis, to fraud detection, stock market trading, and online
dating.
The AI community has been very successful in developing
AI that outperforms humans in complex analytical tasks, such
as chess [3], checkers [4], and jeopardy [5]. However, hu-
mans still retain their supremacy in tasks that require intuitive
judgment [6]. One example of such tasks are repeated social
interactions, which can be modeled as repeated games. Many
repeated games have multiple (often infinite; see the folk the-
orem [7]) equilibria that limits the usefulness of analytical
reasoning for prescribing successful behavior against arbitrary
associates. In these games, successful agents must resort to
intuitive judgment to quickly adapt to unknown associates.
Humans are often able to arrive at cooperative solutions in
these scenarios [8, 9]. However, human capacity to find such
desirable solutions appears to rely on many psychological
mechanisms that are not yet fully understood, though our
understanding of how humans find such solutions is growing
[10, 11]. In particular, many key human (behavioral) strategies
have been identified theoretically [12] and verified through a
growing body of experimental evidence [13, 14].
Despite this knowledge, AI algorithms for repeated inter-
actions have been far less successful at finding cooperative
solutions than humans for various reasons. Many algorithms
produce myopic strategies that fail to learn profitable coopera-
tive strategies in repeated games. They also adapt too slowly
for realistic interaction, often requiring thousands of interac-
tions to learn good behavior even in the simplest games. Some
competitive algorithms have been extremely successful in spe-
cial cases (e.g., Tit-for-tat in the Prisoners’ Dilemma [15] and
algorithms for large zero-sum games such as Poker [16]), but
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finding successful algorithms for repeated general-sum games
played against arbitrary associates has proven difficult. This
suggests that humans are “still safe” from machines in tasks
that require social cooperation and coordination.
However, some recently-developed AI algorithms for re-
peated games now adapt on time scales applicable to human
interaction. Thus, for the first time, we can compare the per-
formance of these algorithms with humans, both in interaction
with humans and against other artificial agents. In this pa-
per, we give experimental evidence that human supremacy
over machines in social games is no longer a given. To show
this, we performed a user study in which 58 participants were
paired with each other and with AI algorithms in a variety of
repeated general-sum games. Our results show that a recently
developed AI algorithm was, overall, more successful in these
games than humans. These results suggest that AI capabili-
ties are catching up to humans in repeated interactions with
(initially) unknown associates.
These results have implications for the ongoing debate
about the risks of increasing automation, especially in envi-
ronments in which distinguishing humans and machines is
non-trivial.
2. Algorithms for Repeated Games
Algorithms for decision making in repeated games have been
studied extensively over the last several decades. One popu-
lar approach is to compute and play a desirable equilibrium
strategy, which is chosen to meet a property of the game or
the assumed tendencies of one’s associate [17, 18, 19]. When
assumptions are correct, this approach can be quite successful.
However, the presence of multiple (often infinite) equilibria
in repeated general-sum games means that these assumptions
are often not met, which sometimes results in the failure of
the algorithm to produce effective strategies.
An alternative approach is to learn a desirable strategy in
real time through experience. Influential learning algorithms
developed for such environments use reinforcement learning
(RL) [20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25], opponent modeling [26, 27],
aspiration learning [28, 29, 30], and expert algorithms [31,
32, 33]. However, until recently, no algorithm has been shown
to learn effective strategies against arbitrary associates in
general-sum games within time scales that are appropriate
for interaction with humans (no more than 100 interactions).
Figure 1 gives a rough characterization of the performance
of a number of these algorithms. Several empirical studies
[34, 25] give a more complete picture of the performance of
existing AI learning techniques for repeated games.
Figure 1 shows the average per-round payoff over time of
representative algorithms in self play in a repeated prisoner’s
dilemma (PD; see Table 1). The figure shows that five of these
algorithms (Exp3 [33], Satisficing [29], Sarsa [35], WoLF-
PHC [23], and M-Qubed [25]) obtain average per-round pay-
offs of between 0.40 or 0.45 for well over the first 100 rounds,
which represents exploratory (random) payoffs in this game
–note that the x-axis is in log-scale. Eventually, these algo-
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Figure 1. Average per-round payoffs over time of eight AI
algorithms in self play in a prisoner’s dilemma (Table 1).
Results are the average payoffs of both players over 50 trials.
Only S++ converges to mutual cooperation (0.60) within 100
rounds, while Fictitious Play and Model-based RL converge
to mutual defection (0.20) in less than 100 rounds. The other
algorithms require much more time to learn.
rithms typically learn in self play to either cooperate (which
results in increased per-round payoffs approaching 0.60) or
defect (which results in decreased per-round payoffs approach-
ing 0.20). While some of the algorithms are quite effective
after hundreds or thousands of rounds of interaction, only
three of these representative algorithms learn in time scales
that are appropriate for interactions with a human: Fictitious
play [26], Model-based RL, and S++. Since Fictitious Play is
too myopic to learn profitable compromises in many games,
we focus on Model-based RL and S++ in this paper.
Model-based RL is a well-known method for learning in
many different scenarios. We use this algorithm to represent
traditional (older) AI techniques. The particular version of
this algorithm that we use in this paper encodes the state of
the world as the last joint action played. It then computes the
state-transition model using the Fictitious-Play assessment
(conditioned, again, on the previous joint action) from which
it uses value iteration to compute a best response. It then
implements an ε-greedy strategy. While it learns to defect in
self play in the PD (Figure 1), this algorithm quickly learns
effectively against leader strategies [36] and other algorithms
in some games.
S++ comes from a family of new (recently developed)
expert algorithms that were shown to quickly learn near opti-
mal behavior against a wide range of associates in repeated
general-sum games [37]. These expert algorithms select from
a set of leader and follower experts, each of which imple-
ments a particular equilibrium strategy. A meta-algorithm
that combines aspiration learning and reasoning over multiple
opponent models trims the set of experts from which the ex-
pert algorithm selects experts in each time period. Crandall
showed that the resulting algorithms outperform other top-
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performing learning algorithms in a wide range of repeated
games played against other AI algorithms.
Since Model-based RL and S++ both learn within time
scales appropriate for interactions with humans, we use these
algorithms to represent the progression of AI in repeated
games. Model-based RL represents traditional (older) AI
algorithms, while S++ represents more recently developed
AI algorithms. In the remainder of this paper, we compare
the performance of these algorithms with that of humans in
various repeated games. We are interested in investigating the
ability of these algorithms to interact with humans and other
algorithms in real time, using the performance of humans as
the benchmark of success.
3. Experimental Setup
To compare the abilities of AI algorithms to that of humans in
repeated interactions, we turn to repeated two-player normal-
form games and, in particular, games of conflicting interest.
These games capture the tension between cooperation and
competition. Such games have been used extensively to iden-
tify the mechanisms that promote cooperation in human and
animal groups [38]. Specific mechanisms have been identified
using theory and simulation [12], building on well-established
models of population dynamics [39]. Many such mechanisms
have also been validated by experiments, in which human par-
ticipants play different kinds of games in controlled laboratory
settings [40, 41, 42].
In two-player normal-form games, each player has a set
of actions available to it. Let Ai denote the set of actions
available to player i. In each round of the game, each player
i ∈ {1,2} selects an action ai ∈ Ai. The resulting joint action
(a1,a2) produces a payoff vector (R1,R2), which denotes the
payoffs to players 1 and 2, respectively, in that round. In
all of the games we consider, the payoffs of the game are
constrained to the range [0,1]. The goal of each player is to
maximize its payoff over the course of the repeated game.
In this study, we considered the four normal-form games
depicted in Table 1. Each of these games represents a different
common scenario in which cooperation and compromise is
difficult to achieve against unknown associates. Furthermore,
each game has an infinite number of Nash equilibria (NE)
of the repeated game, given that the game repeats after each
round with high enough probability. The first game is the
Prisoners’ Dilemma (PD). In the PD, defection (d) is the
dominant strategy for both players. However, this joint action
is Pareto dominated by the solution (c,c) which leads to a
payoff of 0.6 for both players. Both players can increase
their payoffs by convincing the other agent to cooperate. The
dilemma or challenge arises from the difficulty of convincing
a rational player that it is better to play a dominated strategy.
The pair (c,d) means the column player gets the temptation
reward of 1.0 for defecting against its partner, while the row
player gets the lowest payoff of 0. Similarly, (d,c) means the
column player gets the lowest payoff of 0 compared to the
defecting partner’s payoff of 1.0.
(a) Prisoners’ Dilemma (PD)
c d
c 0.60, 0.60 0.00, 1.00
d 1.00, 0.00 0.20, 0.20
(b) Chicken
a b
a 0.84, 0.84 0.33, 1.00
b 1.00, 0.33 0.00, 0.00
(c) Shapley’s Game
a b c
a 0, 0 1, 0 0, 1
b 0, 1 0, 0 1, 0
c 1, 0 0, 1 0, 0
(d) Chaos Game
a b c
a 0.46, 0.67 0.24, 0.06 1.00, 0.00
b 0.00, 0.37 0.37, 0.07 0.01, 0.53
c 0.14, 0.69 0.20, 1.00 0.71, 0.90
Table 1. Payoff matrices of four games considered in our
study. In each cell, the row player’s payoff is listed first,
followed by the column player’s payoff.
Chicken, also known as the hawk-dove game in evolution-
ary game theory [43], models a situation where agents are
in equilibrium when they choose opposing actions (i.e. one
player chooses action a while the other chooses action b and
vice versa). However, the agents differ in which equilibrium
they prefer. Alternatively, the agents could both receive a high
payoff if they both play a which can also be made an equilib-
rium in repeated games given threats. Again, this represents
a challenge for players on how to communicate their will-
ingness to play a mutually beneficial solution through their
actions.
Shapley’s game, proposed by Lloyd Shapley [44], is a
variation on rock, paper, scissors. This game is of interest
because it has been shown that most learning algorithms do
not converge when they play it [26]. The game does not have a
pure one-shot NE, but rather a unique one-shot mixed strategy
NE in which all agents play randomly. This NE yields a payoff
of 1/3 to each agent. However, in repeated interaction, both
agents can do better by alternating between getting a payoff of
0 and 1, which results in a Pareto-optimal outcome in which
both players get an average payoff of 0.5.
Chaos was designed by the authors such that the ‘right’
action is not immediately obvious. Like the PD, the game
has three Pareto-optimal solutions and a single one-shot NE
solution in which both players play a. However, the game is
less structured than the PD and has a larger strategy space,
which seemingly would make cooperation and compromise
more difficult to learn against arbitrary associates.
Each participant in the study played all four repeated
games, each of which against four different (unknown) asso-
ciates. The length of each game was unknown to the partici-
pants in advance to avoid end-game effects; each game was
played for between 50 and 57 rounds (thus, we report only
on results over the first 50 rounds). The four different asso-
ciates with which the participants were paired were another
human participant, Model-based RL, S++, and a tit-for-tat
style agent,1 which was included originally for control pur-
1For clarity of exposition and since we only consider learning algorithms
in this paper, we do not present results related to the tit-for-tat-style associate.
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poses. The order of the games and associates experienced
by the participants was varied throughout the study. Care
was taken to ensure that the participants did not know who
they were paired with at any time (human or artificial agent).
Participants joined the study in groups, typically of six people.
The study protocol was approved by the university’s ethics
board.
The repeated games were played on a desktop computer.
All games were played with perfect information. That is,
participants were shown the payoff matrix on the computer
screen, which showed the payoffs of both players in the game.
After selecting their action in each round of the game (by
clicking the corresponding button), the participants were told
the action chosen by their associate and the payoff received by
both players in that round. To give incentive to participants to
do their best in the study, payment to the subjects was based on
their performance. Each participant received between $5 and
$15, proportional to payoffs they received when playing the
games. A total of 58 people from a university campus partici-
pated in the study. The participants were almost exclusively
graduate students and postdoctoral associates.
4. Experimental Results
We discuss the results of our study in two parts. First, we
consider how each agent (human or algorithm) performed
in self play (i.e., scenarios in which both players are of the
same type). An algorithm’s success in self play is critical
to its evolutionary robustness [15]. Second, we evaluate the
performance of the agents when they associate with each
other. These comparisons speak to the agents’ abilities to inter-
act successfully with arbitrary associates, which is necessary
when players cannot pick their associates or the algorithms
they use, such as with ad hoc teams [45].
4.1 Self Play
The payoffs obtained by humans, S++, and Model-based RL
in self play are summarized in Figures 2 and 3. Figure 2
shows a general trend across the four repeated games used in
the study. While both S++ and humans outperformed model-
based RL overall in self play, S++ obtained higher average
payoffs than did humans.
The reason for the superiority of S++ over humans and
Model-based RL in self play is indicated by Figure 3, which
shows the average payoffs obtained by the agents as interac-
tions progressed in each game. The figure shows that, in each
game, the average payoffs of S++ increased over time in self
play. These increases occurred as the S++ agents learned to
cooperate and coordinate with each other. On the other hand,
the average payoffs of humans and Model-based RL did not
consistently increase over time in these games. People often
failed to learn to make mutually beneficial compromises with
each other in this study.
This algorithm performs very effectively in some scenarios and very poorly
in others. Overall, its performance was below that of S++ in the study.
We do observe some variations by game. While S++
clearly outperformed humans and model-based RL in self
play in the PD and in Chaos over all rounds of the game, it
was not as dominant in Chicken and Shapley’s game over this
time horizon. For example, in Chicken, S++ spends the initial
rounds of the game trying to bully its associate. Once both
agents find they cannot bully the other, they then begin to
learn to play the solution (a,a), which results in each player
receiving a payoff of 0.83. This is sometimes not achieved
until after 50 rounds are completed. Thus, in the long term,
S++ performs very well in self play in this game, though it
performs rather poorly in early rounds.
Coupled with the results shown in Figure 1, these results
demonstrate the superiority of humans over older artificial
learning processes (such as Model-based RL) in self play in
tasks that require players to use intuitive judgment to establish
effective collaboration in repeated interactions. However, our
results show that humans are not as effective in self play as
S++, a recently developed AI algorithm for repeated interac-
tions. We believe that this represents a maturation in AI with
respect to decision making in this domain.
4.2 Against Each Other
While performing well in self play is one important criterion of
success, effective algorithms for repeated interactions must be
able to learn to make profitable compromises when interacting
with arbitrary associates. The results of the pairings of the
agents (humans, S++, and model-based RL) with each other
help to establish how well each agent meets this objective.
The results of these pairings are summarized in Figure 4.
Against each kind of associate, we are interested in how the
performances of S++ and Model-based RL compare to the
performance of humans.
Figures 4(a) and 4(d) summarize the performance of the
three agents when paired with humans. These figures show
that, overall, there was not a huge difference between the per-
formance of humans and S++ against other humans. Humans
and S++ perform about the same overall. However, Model-
based RL had lower performance overall against humans than
did S++ and humans. Thus, S++ appears to interact with
people in these games just as well as people interact with each
other, while the older AI algorithm was not as effective.
When paired with another agent that is using S++, S++
outperformed both humans and Model-based RL on average
in each of the four games (Figures 4(b) and 4(e)). Addition-
ally, consistent with the other scenarios in our study, people
outperformed Model-based RL learning against S++. The
same overall trends are present when agents interacted with
Model-based RL (Figures 4(c) and 4(f)), though results do
vary from game to game. S++ tended to outperform humans
against Model-based RL. Both S++ and humans had higher
average payoffs overall against Model-based RL than Model-
based RL achieves in self play.
In short, against all three types of associates, S++ either
performed on par with or outperformed humans overall. Mean-
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(b) Self play summary: Last 10 rounds
Figure 2. Average payoffs of both players in self play in each game. Error bars show the standard error of the mean.
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Figure 3. Average payoffs of both players over time in self play in each game.
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Figure 4. Mean payoffs for each pairing. Error bars show standard error on the mean. In our experimental set-up, humans
played as column players so all results of pairings vs.Humans represents those of the row player. While, the results for other
players: S++ and Model-Based RL show the payoff to the row player. This distinction is especially important because of Chaos
which is asymmetric.
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while, both S++ and humans outperformed Model-based RL
across these games. These results speak to the maturation of
AI algorithms. At least in these games, our study indicates
that new AI algorithms are beginning to learn to cooperate
and compromise in repeated games at least as well as humans.
5. Conclusions and Discussion
New learning algorithms for playing general-sum repeated
normal-form games are now able to converge in a reasonable
number of rounds, thus enabling us for the first time to in-
vestigate their performance in interactions with people. We
evaluated the agents and humans across the four normal-form
games shown in Table 1. These games (except for Chaos) are
well-studied games from the literature, each of which repre-
sents a different common scenario. To be successful in each of
these games, an algorithm must be able to learn to make and
accept profitable compromises in many different situations.
Via a user study, we compared the performance of humans
with Model-based RL and S++, a recently-published AI learn-
ing algorithm for repeated games. In self play, S++ performed
better than people and Model-based RL in all games except
Chicken. However, even in Chicken, S++ shows steady im-
provement in its performance as the game proceeds, so that
its average payoffs eventually meet or eclipse those of hu-
mans and Model-based RL. Furthermore, our study showed
that S++ was as successful when paired with humans as hu-
mans are when paired with each other. It also outperformed
both humans and Model-based RL when paired with S++ and
Model-based RL. The consistency displayed by S++ shows
an ability to learn to make the right choices in a variety of
scenarios, and demonstrates that new AI algorithms appear to
be gaining the ability to match humans in repeated interaction
against arbitrary associates.
One of the weaknesses of our analysis is reliance on a
small number of games. While this is an informative start,
a comprehensive comparison between human and AI perfor-
mance requires a more systematic investigation in a wider
variety of games. Further, it is well-known that human per-
formance in repeated games is highly sensitive to contextual
factors, such as the framing of the game, the time given, or the
presence of random noise [11, 13, 14]. In the future, we plan
to broaden our present study to investigate the role played by
these factors in human-AI social interaction.
We note that AI algorithms were previously shown to com-
pete effectively with humans in large zero-sum games such
as Poker [16]. These games have unique equilibria charac-
teristics that better support more traditional forms of game-
theoretic reasoning. It remains an open problem to create AI
algorithms that can learn quickly enough to compete with hu-
mans in large repeated general-sum (stochastic) games played
against arbitrary associates.
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